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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TTS DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION
OVER THIS APPEAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO
PRESENT "SUBSTANTIAL AND IMPORTANT" REASONS AS
REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW.
This Court should deny Defendants' Petition because there are no substantial and

important reasons for this Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision ("Decision").
Rule 46 controls this Court's review of petitions for writ of certiorari: "Review by a writ
of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for
special and important reasons." Utah R. Civ. App. 46(a). The Rule lists four examples
that this Court will consider in determining whether "special and important" reasons exist
to justify review. Id. at Rule 46(a)(l)-(4).
Defendants/Appellants ("Defendants") cite only two reasons in support of this
Court's jurisdiction: 1) the Decision conflicts with other Court of Appeals' decisions;
and, 2) the Decision conflicts with this Court's prior decisions. Defendants'/Appellants'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("Petition") at 9. Neither claim is accurate, as will be
shown below. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals' decision is in harmony with prior
decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals. This Court should therefore decline its
jurisdiction because it is not justified by substantial and important reasons required under
the Rules. Before turning to that analysis, however, it is appropriate to consider the
public policy that supports denial of this Court's jurisdiction.
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A,

STARE DECISIS AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT
SUPPORT JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE DECISION
IN THIS CASE IS IN HARMONY WITH PRIOR CASES.

In the context of Rule 46(a)(1) and (2), the doctrine of stare decisis compels
appellants to demonstrate an actual conflict for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction.1
The principle of stare decisis is that, "[w]hen a court lays down a rule of law attaching a
specific legal consequence to a detailed set of facts, the court must adhere to the legal
principle it has announced by applying it in all subsequent cases that come before it
presenting a similar factual premise." Comment, THE STRAITS OF STARE DECISIS AND THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS: NAVIGATING THE SCYLLA OF UNDER-APPLICATION AND THE
CHARYBDIS OF OVER-APPLICATION,

633 BYU L. Rev 1994 at 641. (footnotes omitted).

There are compelling public policy reasons that support this Court's application of the
principle of stare decisis, and decline jurisdiction in this case, including reliance and
stability interests, judicial expedition and economy, and the image of justice. Id. at 641.
In this case, because there is no conflict between the Decision and decisions of the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court, this Court is bound to apply its prior decisions to the
case at bar, and deny Defendants' petition for writ of certiorari.

1

This is not to say that there can be no other "special and important" reasons for
this Court to exercise its jurisdiction. There may be other reasons. See, e.g. Utah R. Civ. App.
46(a)(3) and (4). In this case, however, these "conflicts" are the only reasons Defendant cites in
support of this Court's jurisdiction.
2
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1.

The Decision is Consistent with Supreme Court Decisions.

There is no conflict between this Court's prior decisions and the Decision. In the
case of Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), this Court recognized that in
medical malpractice cases, there is no need for expert testimony where lay jurors can
understand the standard of care. In Nixdorf, this Court held that no expert testimony was
required to establish the standard of care where a doctor left a surgical cutting needle in
the Plaintiff. Id. at 352. This principle is sometimes called the "common-knowledge"
exception in the context of medical malpractice. See, e.g.. Decision at ^ 8. Nixdorf is the
most recent Supreme Court case in a line of cases that illustrate the common-knowledge
exception in medical malpractice cases. See, Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 352 n.5, and numerous
cases cited therein. As shown infra, Nixdorf has been consistently followed by Utah
Courts in medical malpractice cases where jurors can understand the applicable standard
of care.2

2

The position of Utah Courts on this issue is consistent with that of other States.
Negligence in health care facilities that involves non-professional care requires no expert
testimony. See, e.g., Moore v. Lewis Smith Memorial Hosp.. Inc., 454 S.E. 2d 190, 191 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1995)(holding injury suffered when Plaintiff movedfromwheelchair to bed in health care
facility was ordinary negligence, and not medical malpractice), and, Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care
Center. 741 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(holding no expert testimony required where standard
to protect disabled woman from rape was within common knowledge ofjurors).
Instead, Courts focus on the character of the care at issue, and not merely where
the injury occurred. See, e ^ , Beverly Enterprise-Virginia, Inc.. T/A. Etc. v. Nichols, 441 S.E.2d
1 (Va. 1994) (holding no expert testimony required to establish nursing home negligence where
patient choked on food and died, where employees failed to assist patient with history of choking
problems); and, Williamson v. Provident Group. Inc.. 550 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Neb. 1996)
(affirming refusal for directed verdict because no expert testimony required in slip and fall case
involving assisted care facility where no professional negligence alleged), rev'd. on other grounds.
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Curiously, Defendants cite Nixdorf to suggest that it conflicted with the Decision.
Petition at 11-12. The Decision, however, cited to Nixdorf to illustrate the common
knowledge exception, and its application to Collins' facts. Decision atffl[7 and 8.
Defendants can not claim that Nixdorf as support for its claim that the Decision is
"conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court," Utah R. Civ. App. P. 46(a)(2). To the
contrary, the Court of Appeals' application of Nixdorf can only be interpreted a
principled example of stare decisis. The Decision is in harmony with Nixdorf and does
not support the exercise of this Court's discretionary jurisdiction.
The other Utah Supreme Court case cited by Defendants addressed an issue not
reached by the Decision, and is not in conflict with the issue on appeal. Defendants cited
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) for the proposition
that the standard of care in a trade or profession must be determined by the testimony of
witnesses in the same trade or profession. Petition at 12. The Court of Appeals,
however, did not reach this issue because it recognized that Collins had established the
applicable standard of care and breach of that standard with lay testimony. Decision at ^
12. The issue before this Court is not who may testify to establish the applicable standard
of care, but whether the jurors needed expert testimony, as a threshold matter, to
understand the applicable standard of care in Collins' case. Wessel simply has no
application to the Decision, and therefore does not illustrate a conflict, much less a
substantial and important reason, to justify the exercise of this Court's discretionary
jurisdiction.
4
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2.

The Decision is Consistent with Other Court of Appeals
Decisions.

The Decision is in harmony with other Court of Appeals decisions. To determine
whether to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, this Court must consider whether "the
Court of Appeals [has rendered] a decision in conflict with the decision of another panel
on the same issue of law." Utah R. Civ. App. P. 46(a)(1). The cases cited by Defendants
do not conflict with the Decision, but are in harmony with it.
The sole issue raised by Defendants' appeal goes to whether the standard of care
in medical malpractice case can be established by lay testimony. Defendant, however,
cited the case of Hoopiiaina v. IHC 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) for several
propositions, including: "expert testimony must be provided in medical malpractice cases
to establish the standard of care, [and to show] defendant's failure to comply with that
standard ...." Petition at 12. Hoopiiaina. however, does not address those issues.
The only issue in Hoopiiaina was whether the plaintiff needed an expert to opine
on medical causation and damages. Hoopiiaina.740 P.2d at 271. In Hoopiiaina. IHC
stipulated to its breach of the standard of care when it gave plaintiff medications that
were prescribed to another patient. Id. Hoopiiaina does not "conflict" with the Decision
because Hoopiiaina never addressed the standard of care, which is the only issue raised in
this appeal. Defendants have failed to show a conflict, let alone substantial and important
reasons, for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.
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The other Court of Appeals case cited by Defendants actually support the
Decision. Defendants cited Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor Inc., 871 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). Petition at 13. The Schreiter case was a negligence case where the plaintiff
sued for personal injuries arising from a fire where the building owner failed to install a
fire sprinkler system. Id. The Court specifically disavowed the need for expert testimony
to establish the standard of care under those facts: "This is simply not a situation where
the issues or facts appear to be so complex or technical that they would otherwise elude
the mental processes of the average citizen." Id. at 575. (citing Nixdorf with approval).
Schreiter is not in conflict with the Decision. To the contrary, Schreiter is another
example of the Court of Appeals exercising the doctrine of stare decisis, and following
this Court's prior authority under similar facts.
*

*

*

In sum, the cases cited by Defendants as the basis for exercising this Court's
discretionary jurisdiction do not show a conflict between the cases and the Decision.
Defendant appears to equate the common-knowledge exception - where expert testimony
is not required to establish the standard of care and breach - with the "conflict" required
for this Court's jurisdiction under Utah law. However, the common-knowledge exception
in medical malpractice cases is well-established and necessary. The application of this
doctrine to the facts of this case simply creates no conflict with Utah case law.
Consequently, there are no substantial and important reasons to justify this Court's
jurisdiction. This Court should therefore deny Defendants' Petition.
6
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R

THIS C0T TRT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANT'S PETITION BECAUSE
ITINVC ES A QUESTION OF WELL-ESTA LISHED STATE LAW
OF LIMI D APPLICATION.

This appeal involves a simple negligence tort claim that deals with well established
legal precedent, and does not warrant this Court's discretionary review. Although
Defendants argued that the Court of Appeals' decision at bar was in "conflict" with prior
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases,3 it is notable that Appellant did not claim that
this appeal should be heard under Rule 46(a)(4). Under that Rule, this Court considers
appeals where the Court of Appeals "has decided an important question o f . . . state . . .
law which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court." Utah R. Civ. App.
P 46(a)(4). (emphasis added). Without trivializing the tragic facts of this case, it is
essentially a negligence case where a severely disabled woman fell from a swing at the
facility of a "healthcare provider," as that term is used in the Utah Healthcare Malpractice
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (11) (1998).
While the issue on appeal is of critical importance to the parties, it is doubtful that
its resolution will have any widespread impact in the field of medical malpractice. The
issue is, after all, a well-recognized "exception" to most malpractice cases, where medical
procedures are typically at issue. Put another way, this case raises an issue that pertains
to a small subcategory of medical malpractice cases, which is already a small subcategory
of negligence cases. The paucity of reported cases on this issue supports this observation.

3

The well-established common-knowledge exception for medical malpractice cases
is not, however, a "conflict." See discussion, supra. Sections A, Parts 1 and 2.
7
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Also, this issue is well settled under Utah law, as evidenced by the principled and
consistent application of this "exception" as reported in the cases. Moreover, the State
has not claimed that this narrow issue raises any special status issues that distinguishes
the State's rolefromthat of a private litigant grappling with the same limited issue. At
bottom, Defendants are simply dissatisfied with the Decision, and have failed to marshal
substantial and important reasons that are required to justify this Court's discretionary
review.
II

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN SECTIONS A. AND C.
ADDRESS NONE OF THE CRITERIA LISTED IN RULE 46, AND
SHOULD BE STRICKEN.
Defendants have ignored the legal requirements of petitions for writ of certiorari,

and its argument should be strickenfromthe record. Rule 49 requires Petitioners to
"present a direct and concise argument explaining the special reasons as provided in Rule
46 for the issuance of the writ." Utah R. Civ. App. P. 49(a)(9). As set forth above, the
only reasons proffered by Defendants went to Rule 46(a)(1) and (2), which showed no
conflict with the cases of this Court or the Court of Appeals.
Despite the specific requirements of Rule 49, the remainder of Defendants'
Argument section mentions no other reason listed under Rule 46. Petition at 9-11
(Section A), and 13-16 (Section C). Instead, Defendants argued the merits of the case
they made at trial. Section A lists at length the regulations that Defendants believe
applied to its treatment of Collins, which they made at trial. Petition at 9-11. Defendants
also recites undisputed facts not at issue in this appeal that show Plaintiffs compliance
8
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with the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. Id- at 10-11. This Court, however, reviews
the decisions of the Court of Appeals, not the trial court. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d
79 (Utah 1992). None of the contents of Section A address the legal requirements for
granting certiorari, and therefore, can not form the basis for the exercise of this Court's
discretionary review.
Section C of the Petition then launches into the merits of the Decision, again, with
no reference to any reason listed under Rule 46. To the extent that Defendants'
arguments go to the merits of the Decision, they circumvent the purpose of principled
discretionary review, namely, to limit review to only those litigants who demonstrate
substantial and important reasons required by Rule 46. Only those litigants may argue
the merits of their case before this Court.4 Defendants may not circumvent the legal
requirements for certiorari by merely ignoring them. These Sections of Defendants'
Petition should be stricken or ignored because they are wholly outside the provisions of
Rule 49, and are both irrelevant and inappropriate at this point in the appeal.

4

Plaintiff resists the temptation to discuss the merits of the case at this time, and is
content to await remand to the trial court after this Court denies Defendant's Petition.
Alternatively, Plaintiff will address the merits of this case if and when this Court believes that
there are "substantial and important" reasons to exercise its discretionary review, notwithstanding
the Court of Appeals' principled and well-reasoned decision.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should deny Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari because there
are no "substantial and important" reasons for this Court to exercise its discretionary
review. While this issue is important to the parties, the issue raised on appeal involves
well established case precedent in a narrow subcategory of medical malpractice cases that
has minimal application outside of this case. The only relevant arguments put forth by
Defendant fail to show any "conflict" with any cases from this Court and/or the Court of
Appeals. Instead, the Decision is well reasoned, principled, and in harmony with the line
of Utah cases that established the common-knowledge exception in medical malpractice
cases. Neither Defendants' arguments to the trial court, nor its beliefs about the merits of
its appeal are relevant or appropriate at this point in the appeal, and should be stricken or
ignored. For these reasons, this Court should deny Petitioner's petition for writ of
certiorari.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2000.

KING & ISAACSON, PX.
By: Brian S. King
Richard R. Burke
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
Vickie Collins
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